Social Patterns of Inequality, Partisan Competition, and Latin American Support for Redistribution

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This article argues that social patterns of inequality and structures of partisan competition play central roles in shaping support for redistribution, offering three important insights concerning redistribution attitude formation. First, pronounced income disparities between ethnic/racial groups reduce support for redistribution. Second, for members of marginalized ethnic groups, entrenched discrimination reflected in large between-group inequalities provokes skepticism regarding state redistributive efforts, undermining their generally favorable attitudes toward redistribution. Third, when party systems feature programmatic competition around distributional issues, citizens are more likely to view government redistribution favorably, particularly where meaningful left options are present, while in systems without programmatic parties advocating pro-poor policy, support for redistribution is weaker. The results based on multilevel analysis of survey data from 18 Latin American countries suggest that building political support for redistribution is more difficult when economic and ethnic inequalities overlap and when party systems lack programmatic appeals emphasizing distributive issues.

In democratic contexts, attitudes toward the role of government in shaping economic outcomes and in redistributing resources are a fundamental input into the political process (Baker and Greene 2011; Huber and Stephens 2012). Contestation surrounding distribution of societal resources is at the heart of politics, motivating voters and politicians alike (Hicks and Swank 1984). Scholars consider distributional attitudes to be crucial for understanding policy outcomes (e.g., Iversen and Soskice 2001; Meltzer and Richard 1981), dynamics of democratic competition (e.g., Pontusson and Rueda 2008), and even regime change (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). Thus, understanding the factors that shape public support for state redistributive action is an important goal. However, scholars share surprisingly little consensus concerning preference formation in this policy arena, with the literature divided over issues such as the relevance of economic rationality and the importance of existing levels of inequality in fostering (or impeding) support for redistribution (Blofield and Luna 2011; Dion and Birchfield 2010; Huber and Stephens 2012). Some studies (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Meltzer and Richard 1983) find a positive relationship between inequality and public pressure for state redistribution as expected by traditional political economy models (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Romer 1975), but others observe a negative or insignificant relationship (Dion and Birchfield 2010; Kelly and Enns 2010).

Our goal is not simply to add more evidence on one side or the other of this long-standing debate but to offer a fresh perspective emphasizing how specific economic structures and political institutions exert significant influence on redistribution attitudes. We argue that the patterns by which economic power and resources are distributed within and across population subgroups shape attitudes toward redistribution by undermining (or heightening) society-wide solidarity (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Tilly 1998). If prosperity and poverty in a country are...
distributed evenly across different population subgroups, then inequality between groups is low, and group identity is not associated with one’s location in the income distribution. On the other hand, a similarly (un)equal society could evidence dramatic inequality between groups, with group membership highly correlated with location in the income distribution. In the former case where rich and poor share similar group identities, attitudes toward redistribution are likely to be more favorable. In the latter case where inequality is structured in ways that concentrate poverty among certain sectors, group-based economic divides undercut social solidarity and weaken overall support for pro-poor policies (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Gilens 2000). Moreover, it is not merely social fragmentation that limits enthusiasm for state redistribution as posited in previous work by Alesina and others (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and Glaeser 2004); rather we emphasize how the distribution of economic resources across these divides plays a crucial role in shaping support for redistribution.

We also explore how group-based inequalities condition the way that individual social identity influences redistribution attitudes. The findings indicate the following: inequalities that disproportionately marginalize certain groups perpetuate the perception that government does little to alter entrenched hierarchies, thereby undermining the state’s credibility as a tool for achieving more equitable resource allocations for all sectors. As a result, individuals belonging to low-status groups facing significant group-based economic disparities are not particularly supportive of redistributive policy because policy makers are not seen as reliable advocates for their interests.

Additionally, we stress the significance of the institutional context for understanding attitudes toward redistribution. The degree to which parties present divergent policy options in a particular issue domain is likely to affect the issue’s salience and provide cues to voters (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Levendusky 2010; Ray 2003). Systems with parties that take distinct positions pertaining to societal resource allocations and the redistributive role of the state call more attention to issues such as inequality and redistribution. As a result, redistribution is more likely to be viewed as a viable goal and a worthwhile point of emphasis in these sorts of partisan environments than in contexts where parties rely on other linkage strategies. In Latin America where most citizens stand to benefit from redistribution, increased salience and viability of distributive issues is likely to translate into greater support for state action in this realm (Blofieeld and Luna 2011), particularly when the party system includes meaningful options on the left because left parties often emphasize redistribution in their rhetoric and policy-making efforts (Huber and Stephens 2012). Alternatively, where parties fail to stake out distinct positions concerning distributional outcomes or where programmatic competition is confined to the center and right, redistribution is overlooked in public debate, and clientelism, personalism, or other issues dominate competition. In such contexts, citizens are less likely to give much credence to society-wide pro-poor policy and more likely to prioritize other sorts of state benefit delivery.

Thus, we argue that understanding redistribution attitudes requires going beyond discussions of individual material interests and existing levels of inequality, which have been the focus of much previous work examining this question. We must account for the extent to which resources are disproportionately distributed across population subgroups, as well as the ways that political parties frame political competition.

Our analysis uncovers important effects for structures of inequality and partisan competition. Inequality that systematically impoverishes historically marginalized ethnic groups diminishes support for redistribution generally and undermines the redistributive credibility of the state among low-status groups particularly. The nature of partisan competition is also important, as ideologically polarized competition is associated with greater support for redistribution when left parties are present. Moreover, after accounting for patterns of inequality and political competition, we uncover evidence that inequality is positively associated with support for redistribution. These results suggest that excluding these factors creates misunderstanding regarding the formation of distributional attitudes and obscures the mechanisms through which inequality shapes support for redistribution.

We explore these ideas in the Latin American context for several reasons. The region, which is notorious for its high levels of inequality, manifests significant variation in structures of inequality and political competition. Some Latin American countries like Uruguay display considerable ethnic homogeneity and low levels of ethnic-based inequalities, while others like Ecuador and Guatemala have ethnic inequalities that would place them among the highest in the world (Baldwin and Huber 2010). Additionally, ideological polarization in the region’s party systems spans a wide range, from parties in Honduras that are largely indistinguishable on distributional issues to the significant schisms that characterize Bolivian party competition (Altman et al. 2009). This variation in patterns of inequality and partisan competition offers considerable leverage in assessing our central theoretical claims that emphasize the importance of these factors for understanding redistribution attitudes. At the same time, focusing on one region
allows us to employ consistent cross-national measures for the individual-level variables in our analysis and promote reliability in the contextual measures. Moreover, understanding the formation of redistribution attitudes is particularly important in the Latin American context, where profound inequality has been a persistent feature of the economic landscape and where distributive outcomes are often (though not always) highly contested.

The next two sections develop the arguments concerning the significance of structures of inequality and political competition for understanding attitudes toward redistribution. We also discuss the rationale for focusing specifically on ethnic patterns of inequality in the Latin American context. We then briefly outline other contextual and individual-level factors that might influence support for redistribution and present our data. We follow by discussing the results of multilevel logit analyses and by considering the empirical and theoretical implications of our findings.

SOCIAL PATTERNS OF INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION ATTITUDES

Traditional theories concerning the connection between income inequality and attitudes toward redistribution frequently expect public support for redistributive policies to be closely linked to existing levels of inequality (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Romer 1975). Studies seeking to explain countries’ redistributive efforts as well as a host of other influences support for redistribution (e.g., Boix 2003; Mahler 2008). However, evidence connecting levels of inequality to redistribution attitudes is mixed (Blofield and Luna 2011). While some studies substantiate such linkages (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Mahler 2008), the bulk of empirical analyses do not support the idea that higher inequality creates demand for more redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Finseraas 2009; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Kelly and Enns 2010). Similarly, previous studies examining the relationship between existing redistribution and distributional attitudes offer inconsistent hypotheses and evidence. Some research suggests that where the state is already taking strong steps to reallocate resources from rich to poor, people see the state as sufficiently active and are less likely to favor redistribution (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1995), but other studies posit a reinforcing relationship in which existing pro-poor policy constitutes a socializing force promoting support for redistribution (Arts and Gelissen 2001; Svalfors 1997). Overall, while theoretical models expect inequality and redistribution to influence attitudes toward government’s distributional effort, the evidence to corroborate these expectations is contradictory and inconclusive.

We move beyond this debate concerning the influence of existing levels of inequality and redistribution on attitudes toward pro-poor policy by elaborating more nuanced connections between inequality and support for redistribution. Building on recent research that seeks to explain state redistributive effort and public goods provision by analyzing how the patterns of inequality within society shape these outcomes (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Lupu and Pontusson 2011), we argue that intrasocietal structures of inequality are also important for explaining cross-national variation in public support for these policies. Inequality patterns are likely to offer especially valuable insights concerning redistribution attitude formation in contexts like Latin America where countries manifest varied social and economic structures, which are causally significant but largely obscured if we rely exclusively on aggregate measures of inequality and redistribution.

Patterns or structures of inequality refer to the distribution of well-being across population subgroups. It is important to note that overall levels of inequality could be identical across societies even while patterns of inequality differ substantially. One country could exhibit dramatic inequality between population subgroups, while another with similar aggregate inequality could evidence very little group-based inequality. In the first case, subgroup membership is highly correlated with position in the income distribution, with certain groups concentrated at the bottom and others at the top. In the second, the subgroup in which a person is situated does not affect the likelihood of being at the top, middle, or bottom of the income distribution. Despite potentially divergent patterns of inequality, traditional political economy models of distributional attitudes assume homogeneous societies where social divides are not salient considerations (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981). In countries where social and economic exclusion tend to be reinforcing, as is often the case in Latin America, the assumptions about preference formation that undergird traditional theorizing about the relationship between inequality and distributional attitudes may not hold. In our

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1. Though see Bénabou (2000) for another view of links between inequality and redistributive attitudes. Many empirical studies cited below find greater support for Benabou’s predictions.

2. In the second society, inequality is driven primarily by disparities between individuals in the same group, while in the first, within-group income gaps may be over-shadowed by between-group differences.
discussion of inequality patterns, we explore how differences in the group-based structures that underlie economic disparities—or the degree to which economic inequalities mirror other social divides—shape redistribution attitudes. We contend that group-based patterns of inequality have the potential to reshape public attitudes toward redistribution both across society as a whole and among those groups most affected by inequality in particular. Here we theorize concerning the potential direct and conditioning effects that between-group inequality may have on support for redistribution.3

As between-group inequality increases (i.e., as economic and social inequalities are reinforcing), we expect overall support for redistribution to decline. This expectation builds on previous research arguing that divisions across ethnic or other social groups undermine support for pro-poor policies (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Gilens 2000; Habyarimana et al. 2009), but we go beyond extant literature to argue that fragmentation alone is not the driving force behind lower levels of support for redistribution in socially or ethnically diverse contexts. Rather we argue that fragmentation becomes relevant in the formation of distributional attitudes when social divides coincide with economic disparities, producing high inequality between groups and reinforcing social cleavages. These kinds of social divides can promote the perception that redistribution only benefits certain segments of society, weakening social solidarity. Thus, where economic inequalities overlap with other group-based cleavages and social solidarity is concomitantly low, we expect less overall support for redistribution.4

Moreover, we theorize that the structure of inequality might condition how an individual’s group identity shapes their redistribution attitudes, positing an interactive effect between the societal structure of inequality and individual identity. Conventional wisdom expects individuals in low-status groups to support redistribution because their status suggests they stand to benefit from redistributive action by the state. We follow extant literature in maintaining this general expectation—on average individuals identifying with low-status groups (e.g., ethnic minorities) are likely to be more supportive of redistribution than those who identify with a high-status group (e.g., dominant ethnic group members). But we also move past this conventional wisdom to consider how the nature of between-group inequality might alter the way individuals in low-status groups view redistribution. We consider two possible, competing mechanisms through which group-based patterns of inequality could condition how individual identity shapes support for redistribution: a social identity mechanism and a political-structural mechanism.

Social identity figures prominently in many existing studies of public opinion generally and attitudes toward the welfare state specifically (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Desmet, Weber, and Ortuño-Ortín 2009; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Kinder and Winter 2001; Shayo 2009). In the realm of support for redistribution, an overlap between economic well-being and group membership might activate group-based preference formation. If larger economic divides between groups have the effect of reinforcing group identity and promoting within-group solidarity, then attitudes held by individuals are likely shaped by the economic interests of their group. Under this view, attitudinal differences between individuals in low- versus high-status groups should be accentuated as the economic gap between them increases, with individuals in low (high)-status groups especially likely to support (oppose) redistribution in contexts of high between-group inequality. Thus, social identity logic expects between-group inequality to promote within group solidarity, heightening support for redistribution among individuals in disadvantaged groups as group-based disparities widen.5

Alternatively, a political-structural logic suggests a competing way that group-based patterns of inequality might condition how individual identity shapes redistribution attitudes. This mechanism is rooted in long-standing power dynamics that create structural disadvantages for certain groups. If economic disparities between groups reflect historical legacies of deeply entrenched economic, social and/
or political exclusion, disadvantaged groups likely face significant obstacles to achieving political influence and rarely attain substantial material gains through state redistribution. Consequently, in contexts of entrenched group-based inequalities where redistribution has not proven to be effective at combating existing hierarchies, individuals from marginalized groups might consider state action through policy change an ineffective avenue for improving their well-being. Instead, individuals belonging to perpetually marginalized groups in contexts of high between-group inequality may conclude that government policy simply reinforces the status quo in favor of high-status interests, leaving low-status groups without an opportunity to alter their trajectory. While some redistribution may occur in such contexts, individuals facing enduring legacies of marginalization do not see themselves as especially likely to benefit from such policies. As a result, the typical positive relationship between identification with a low-status group and support for redistribution is likely to be reduced or even offset entirely in contexts where between-group inequalities are high and deeply embedded, a pattern frequently observed in Latin America (Gootenberg and Reygadas 2010). In contrast to the social identity mechanism outlined above, this perspective predicts that greater economic disparities between groups will attenuate support for redistribution among the disadvantaged, tempering the extent to which individuals from excluded groups favor state efforts to redistribute.6

These rival hypotheses concerning the social identity mechanism and the political-structural mechanism are conditional, which is to say they do not make predictions about the average effect of low status identity on distributional attitudes. Rather, they posit an interactive effect, focusing on how between-group inequality might accentuate or attenuate the conventionally anticipated positive relationship between low status identity and support for redistribution. The social identity view expects between-group inequality to heighten the positive effect of low status identity on support for redistribution, while the political-structural argument expects the typical positive relationship to be tempered or offset entirely in contexts where group-based economic disparities are high.

While it is possible to conceive of a multitude of patterns pertaining to the structure of inequality (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Blofield and Luna 2011; Lupu and Pontusson 2011), in this article we focus on patterns of inequality across racial and ethnic groups. Scholars have pointed to ethnic divides as disruptive for accomplishing a variety of public goods including peace, economic growth, social investment and redistribution, making consideration of ethnic-based inequality particularly important (Alesina et al. 1999; Desmet et al. 2009; Sambanis and Shayo 2013). In the Latin American context, inequalities rooted in ethnic and racial divides are especially relevant, as blacks and indigenous people have long faced significant barriers to social equality, economic opportunities, and political representation. Moreover, the economic and political incorporation of marginalized ethnic groups remains a significant challenge, particularly in countries where large indigenous populations exist (Van Cott 2000).

Further to our focus here, Pribble (2010) argues that Latin American welfare state regimes are, in fact, strongly shaped by the degree of ethnic division, suggesting an important connection between ethnic inequalities and policies related to redistribution. Broadly, comparative studies of Latin American welfare states consistently find that ethnically diverse countries have less generous and less effective welfare states than those in more homogenous societies (Huber and Stephens 2012; Lustig, Pessino, and Scott 2014). Country-level incidence studies regarding the effects of government taxing and spending also reinforce the significance of ethnic composition in understanding regional variation in welfare state structures. These analyses reveal that Latin American countries with large indigenous and Afro-descendant populations exert less redistributive effort than those in more homogeneous countries, and this observation persists in countries with small welfare states like Guatemala and in contexts of comparatively high social spending as in Brazil and Bolivia (Arauco et al. 2014; Cabrera, Lustig, and Morán 2015; Higgins and Pereira 2014;

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6. Discriminatory practices in the design or delivery of social policy would exacerbate skepticism of redistributive policy among individuals belonging to low-status groups. While we are not aware of scholarship that identifies explicit intention to discriminate against historically marginalized groups in the legal or administrative framework governing contemporary Latin American social policy, there is considerable evidence that policies or social investment patterns frequently produce de facto discriminatory practices disadvantaging those from traditionally excluded racial and ethnic groups. For instance, several studies have identified discrepancies in the quality of public schools to the detriment of indigenous communities (Hopenhayn 2008; Trivelli 2005). Others have pointed to racial or ethnic disparities in access to public infrastructure, patterns of social investment and quality of public health services (Coba 2005; Gandelman, Nopo, and Ripani 2011, Machinea, Bárccena, and León 2005; Ponce 2006). Perhaps the most troubling, recent example of discriminatory social policy is the Peruvian family planning program enacted by President Fujimori in the 1990s, which resulted in the forced sterilization of thousands of primarily indigenous women (Ewig 2006). Where present, these kinds of encounters with social policy, either through poor services, uneven benefit delivery, or at worst, human rights violations disguised as social policy, are likely to heighten skepticism among already marginalized groups concerning the ability of state redistribution to effect meaningful change.
Lustig et al. 2014). The extant literature clearly indicates that indigenous or black individuals living in countries with significant ethnic or racial diversity are especially likely to encounter welfare states that accomplish very little redistribution, fail to close inequalities between ethnic groups and leave established hierarchies untouched by government policy making. Patterns of inequality rooted in racial and ethnic differences are thus likely to have significant implications for our understanding of Latin American support for redistribution, yet these ethnic dimensions have been largely overlooked in previous studies of redistribution attitudes in the region.

PARTISAN COMPETITION AND THE PRIMING OF REDISTRIBUTION

The institutional context, particularly the nature of political competition, may also have important effects on attitudes toward redistribution. While previous research has considered how institutional arrangements shape distributional outcomes (e.g., Iversen and Soskice 2006), these studies assume programmatic party competition. Yet this assumption does not hold uniformly across Latin America where distributional issues are not always politicized in programmatic ways. Despite generally high levels of support for redistribution (Cramer and Kaufman 2011) and the existence of large poor populations who would presumably benefit from redistributive policies, many Latin American party systems lack meaningful programmatic competition over distributional issues (Kitschelt et al. 2010), and parties frequently lack strong ties to lower class interests (Huber and Stephens 2012). In these contexts, one cannot assume that parties’ positions simply reflect the distributional preferences of their constituencies and that competition over redistributive policies will naturally emerge (Luna and Zechmeister 2005). In fact, programmatic party systems that feature meaningful competition on distributional issues are far from the norm in Latin America where building programmatic structuration has often been a long, arduous process requiring a particular combination of capacity for collective action and historical openings for lower class interests to engage in electoral competition (Huber and Stephens 2012; Kitschelt et al. 2010; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Moreover, ideological differentiation proved difficult to sustain through the neoliberal era as economic and policy constraints produced convergence in many previously programmatic party systems (Morgan 2011; Morgan, Hartlyn, and Espinal 2011; Roberts 2015; Stokes 2001). Thus, the significance of programmatic competition is uneven across the region, and parties frequently downplay distributional conflict and emphasize other forms of linkage.

Whether or not parties take distinct programmatic stands on distributional issues is likely to either heighten or downplay the salience of redistributive policy and could affect the extent to which citizens favor state efforts to redistribute in programmatic ways. Previous research suggests that issue priming is an important mechanism linking the behavior of parties to individual attitudes (Levendusky 2010; Ray 2003). For instance, recent work in European politics indicates that party strategy concerning European integration created variation in the issue’s salience in different countries. Where parties took divergent positions on integration, the issue was more likely to be salient for voters, who responded by taking more identifiable stands on integration as well (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Ray 2003). Similar patterns concerning the role of parties and political elites in priming certain issues and promoting particular attitudes in the mass public can be seen in other contexts as well (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Morgan and Buice 2013). We draw on this logic in hypothesizing that Latin Americans will be more attuned to redistributonal policies when parties take distinguishable and divergent positions on such issues, as opposed to prioritizing other linkages strategies. And in Latin America where the majority of citizens would stand to benefit if government were to implement effective and non-discriminatory pro-poor policies, partisan competition that actsuates redistribution as an issue and emphasizes it as a worthwhile policy goal is likely to increase overall support for redistribution by creating the perception among the many potential beneficiaries of pro-poor policies that efforts in this vein are a viable strategy for enhancing well-being.

Alternatively, where parties fail to take distinct positions on distributional issues, politicians are more likely to prioritize development of clientelist networks, rely on personalism, or focus their rhetoric and policy efforts on other concerns (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). As a result, distributional concerns are excluded from public debate, and citizens are less likely to emphasize redistributive policy as...
an effective strategy for addressing their needs. This pattern contrasts with contexts where programmatic parties specifically call for and implement policies that reallocate resources from rich to poor, making redistribution seem like a feasible and meaningful goal. For these reasons, where parties take clearly differentiated ideological positions, we expect redistribution to be politically salient and actively favored by citizens. Conversely, greater uniformity in party stances on distributional issues sends the signal that such issues are not a meaningful source of political competition, and citizens who might benefit from redistribution are less likely to advocate strongly for redistributive policy, perhaps favoring other more particularistic forms of benefits. Some evidence for this view already exists in recent studies (Blofield and Luna 2011).

Of course, not all programmatic competition is created equal. If programmatic party competition is concentrated on the right side of the spectrum, pitting a centrist party against a right-leaning one, for instance, redistributive rhetoric is likely to be downplayed, pro-poor policy is unlikely to emerge, and citizens will not experience the priming of distributional concerns. Conversely, programmatic systems that include important left parties are likely to feature redistribution as a major theme in campaigns and policy making, intensifying redistribution’s salience (Huber and Stephens 2012; Morgan and Kelly 2013). As a result, we posit an interactive effect between programmatic competition and the ideological tenor of that competition. We expect programmatic competition’s priming of distributional concerns to be magnified in party systems that offer meaningful options on the left, amplifying the pro-redistribution effects of programmatic differentiation, while the positive effect of programmatic competition is likely to be minimized or even reversed where left parties are absent.9

**INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS AND REDISTRIBUTION ATTITUDES**

Contextual features like structures of inequality and political competition are not the only factors that have the potential to shape redistribution attitudes. Considerable research has analyzed how individual characteristics influence support for redistribution. Based on this scholarship, we expect indicators of economic well-being to shape redistribution attitudes. People with more resources (or those who perceive their economic situation more positively) may consider redistribution a threat, while those at the bottom are likely beneficiaries of redistribution and thus more inclined to support such efforts (Blofield and Luna 2011; Gaviria 2007; Meltzer and Richard 1981). Our analysis incorporates an objective measure of household wealth and a subjective indicator of personal economic evaluations to explore these possibilities. Perceptions of the national economy may also shape support for redistribution. Those who view the economy as performing well may be more supportive of redistribution because they see it as more feasible when the national economy is improving (Stevenson 2001), although a strong economy might encourage individuals to deem redistribution unnecessary as economic opportunities abound during good times (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Morgan and Kelly 2010).

Religious values are also likely to influence views of redistribution. Religion, particularly the varieties of Catholicism and Pentecostalism common in Latin America, has historically opposed state efforts to influence distributive outcomes. Thus, we expect religious Latin Americans to be less supportive of redistribution than their more secular neighbors (De La O and Rodden 2008; Scheve and Stasavage 2006).

Finally, we consider how sociodemographic factors might affect whether people are hurt or helped by redistribution, influencing their support for such policies. People who are older, less educated, and from historically marginalized groups are more likely to benefit from redistributive policies and thus favor state redistribution (Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006; Finseraas 2009; Gaviria 2007). However, recalling the theoretical argument outlined above, the effect of membership in a disadvantaged ethnic group may be conditioned by country-level structures of ethnic inequality.

**DATA AND METHODS**

To assess the factors that shape support for state redistribution, we employ individual-level public opinion data from the 2008 and 2010 AmericasBarometer surveys together with country-level data from a variety of sources.10

To measure support for redistribution, we use a question that asked respondents the extent to which they agreed that the state should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor.11 Within

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9. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to consider the potential conditioning effect of party ideology.

10. The surveys use national probability samples of voting age adults. Interviews were carried out face-to-face in the respondent’s favored language. Countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

11. See the appendix for additional details concerning all variables utilized in the analysis below.
Latin America, Paraguayans, Chileans, and Uruguayans have especially high levels of support for redistribution, while Hondurans and Venezuelans have lower levels. But overall, Latin Americans, who experience some of the world’s most extreme economic inequities, have quite favorable attitudes toward redistribution. In light of these generally high levels of support, we follow previous research on attitudes toward redistribution (e.g., Cramer and Kaufman 2011) and focus our analytical attention on explaining particularly positive attitudes, coding the dependent variable such that those who strongly favor state redistribution are coded as 1 and all others are coded as 0.

In analyzing redistribution attitudes, we consider the effects of several features of the economic and political context. We incorporate three measures pertaining to inequality and redistribution. First and most central to our theoretical focus, we measure between-ethnic group inequality (BGI) to assess how ethnic patterns of inequality shape redistribution attitudes. Our measure of BGI focuses on income differentials between major ethnic groups in each country based on methods of inequality decomposition developed and used extensively by economists (Mancini, Stewart, and Brown 2008; Pyatt 1976). BGI is calculated by assigning individuals within an ethnic group the mean wealth for the group and then proceeding with calculating a Gini in the usual way (Baldwin and Huber 2010, 646). This calculation produces an estimate of the degree of inequality between groups, similar to the way the Gini estimates inequality between individuals. A country’s BGI equals zero if each ethnic group has the same mean income and increases as between-group differences widen. This measure allows us to capture the degree to which prosperity or poverty accrue disproportionately to certain ethnic groups, weighting according to group size. This operationalization of BGI is based on a long line of economic research and reflects the complexity of group-based inequalities in multiethnic societies by capturing all group-based income disparities in a single measure, providing a measure of the extent to which inequalities are based on between-group differences and contrasting with other measures of group inequality that simply compare each ethnic group separately to the country’s mean income. This society-wide measure of BGI reflects the complexity of group-based inequalities in multiethnic societies and allows us to assess contextual and cross-level hypotheses about how BGI shapes distributional attitudes by undermining solidarity across society as a whole and by altering the way individual ethnic identity influences support for redistribution. To capture a potential conditioning relationship between BGI and membership in a disadvantaged group, we also interact BGI with black and indigenous ethnicity.

Our second and third measures pertaining to inequality and redistribution are the levels of these variables, which capture the typical way these concepts are incorporated into analyses of redistribution attitudes. We measure inequality using Gini coefficients based on gross household income adjusted for household size. Higher values indicate more inequality. The level of redistribution is estimated by differencing the gross and net income Ginis and dividing by the gross income Gini. This calculation tells us how much the Gini changes as a result of government effort via taxes and transfers. Lower values indicate less redistribution.

To assess how the nature of party competition shapes attitudes toward redistribution, we include a measure that captures the extent to which parties in each country take distinct programmatic positions as opposed to relying on alternative forms of linkage. Using data from an expert survey conducted by the Duke University Democracy and Accountability Project (Altman et al. 2009), we calculate each party’s mean placement on a scale assessing the extent to which it advocates social spending benefiting the poor. Then for each party system, we estimate the weighted standard deviation of the party means. Larger standard deviations indicate more polarization in parties’ ideological

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12. Other measures of support for redistribution in Latin America are also skewed, requiring a similar strategy to the one employed here (Cramer and Kaufman 2011). Given the structure of responses to the question, the requirements for OLS-based regression are not met. Therefore, a nonlinear estimation procedure is necessary regardless of the coding for the dependent variable. Analysis that leaves the 7-point scale intact produces the same substantive findings as those based on the dichotomous dependent variable.

13. Houle (2015) also uses the term “between-group inequality” to refer to an income ratio measure drawn from Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011), which they call simply group inequality. This ratio essentially captures where specific groups fit into the social/economic hierarchy. There are several important differences between the conventional measure of BGI we use and measures of group inequality based on income ratios or gaps between groups: (1) measures based on ratios or gaps only reflect the well-being of a particular group, while our measure captures inequalities between all relevant groups simultaneously; (2) the alternative measures do not account for group size, while the traditional BGI does; (3) other approaches produce a group-level measure as opposed to the country-level measure employed here.

14. Both measures are based on the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), which offers cross-national comparability and broad coverage for Latin America (Solt 2008).

15. This follows a measurement strategy originally developed by Dalton (2008) and applied in various studies analyzing party positions in Latin America and elsewhere (Carlin, Singer, and Zechmeister 2015; Kitschelt and Freeze 2010; Singer 2016).
positions and clearer options for voters. On average, we expect higher scores to be associated with greater support for redistribution. To consider how the presence (absence) of important left parties might amplify (minimize) the positive effect of programmatic competition, we interact party system polarization with a measure of the ideological composition of the legislature, which reflects the extent to which left parties are serious players in the political arena.16

Additionally, to control for the possibility that people living in more prosperous countries have different levels of support for redistribution than their counterparts in poor countries, the analysis incorporates a measure of per capita income adjusted for purchasing power and inflation (United Nations Development Program 2011).17 Finally, based on our discussion above concerning the ways that individual characteristics and attitudes might influence attitudes toward redistribution, our analysis considers several individual-level variables: economic well-being, sociotropic and idiotropic economic evaluations, religious service attendance, age, education, sex, and ethnicity. Question wordings, descriptive statistics, and other details about these measures are in the appendix, available online.

To assess how these factors shape Latin American attitudes toward redistribution, we employ hierarchical logit analysis with individuals nested in countries, nested in years. From the perspective of theory testing, this approach allows us to explore individual and contextual effects, offering excellent purchase over the hypotheses specified above. From a methodological perspective, this modeling strategy is well suited to deal with the data structure we encounter here because it accounts for clustering in the error term that is common when combining individuals from different countries and years in a single analysis and addresses the threat of biased standard errors (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002).18

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17. Appendix table 5 considers poverty rates as an additional predictor. In some (but not all) models, poverty has a positive statistically significant relationship with support for redistribution as we might expect. But its effects were substantively small and its inclusion does not alter our other findings.
18. We model the three-level structure of the data, but given the small N at the third level we also estimated two-level models with individuals nested in country-years. The substantive conclusions drawn from the two-level models are nearly identical to those based on the three-level models reported below. The only point of nonconformity is that the coefficient for the interaction between party system polarization and legislative partisan balance does not attain statistical significance in the two-level model. However, the basic pattern of the relationship is consistent across both versions of the analysis—party polarization is associated with more support for redistribution and this effect is stronger in places where meaningful left parties compete.
19. Appendix figure 2 presents a scatterplot of the country-level relationship between BGI and redistribution attitudes, which also reveals a negative relationship and reinforces the argument that high BGI is associated with less support for redistribution.
20. See appendix table 2. Including BGI and polarized parties also significantly improves model fit. A likelihood ratio test comparing model 1 here to the traditional political economy model presented in appendix table 2 produces a χ² statistic of 70.67 (2df), which surpasses the .01 threshold for significance.

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**ANALYSIS AND RESULTS**

We present the results of our analysis in table 1. In our discussion, we focus first on the contextual effects presented in the top half of the table before reviewing the individual-level effects below. At the country-year level, model 1 includes BGI and party system polarization, which capture the concepts at the center of our theoretical discussion. The model also incorporates measures of overall inequality, redistribution, and per capita income to reflect variables emphasized in standard models of redistribution attitudes. Immediately, we observe that BGI has a significant negative effect, reducing support for redistribution. This finding substantiates the hypothesis that mutually reinforcing cleavages along ethnic and economic divides weaken social affinities across society, undermining public support for policies designed to benefit the economically disadvantaged.19 In contexts of high BGI, “the poor” are likely viewed as not only economically disadvantaged, but also reflecting a different ethnic composition than more affluent sectors of society. Ethnic divides between the poor and nonpoor weaken social solidarity and make public generosity less palatable.

Model 1 also considers how traditional explanations of distributional attitudes perform when controlling for social patterns of inequality. The evidence supports the commonly articulated hypothesis that more inequality fosters support for redistribution. However, this effect only emerges in models that control for BGI, effectively accounting for the internal social structure of distributional patterns. Without BGI in the model, inequality has a statistically significant negative relationship with support for redistribution, opposite the traditionally hypothesized effect.20 Together these results suggest that different kinds of inequality push distributional attitudes in different directions. While inequality generally increases support for redistribution, in contexts where between-group differences are an important part of the distributional story, the negative effects of BGI mitigate inequality’s pro-redistribution effect. Scatter plots in appendix figure 3 depict the relationship between the Gini and distributional attitudes for countries with high and low levels of BGI.
and lend further credibility to this conclusion. There we observe that a positive slope for the Gini only emerges where BGI is low. When inequality is rooted in ethnic divides, there is little evidence that inequality is associated with positive views of redistribution. This pattern in which inequality alone does not behave as expected unless the model also accounts for the ethnic structure of the income distribution strongly suggests that understanding the relationship between inequality and distributional preferences is not possible without careful attention to the sociostructural composition of the income distribution and the origins of inequality. We also observe that support for redistribution is higher in contexts where average incomes are high and existing redistributive effort is low.

Additionally, model 1 reveals a significant positive relationship between the ideological distinctiveness of parties and support for redistribution. This finding aligns with our general expectation. Parties that stake out competing positions on pro-poor policy engage in partisan competition on this issue, heightening the salience of redistributive policy. In Latin America where pro-poor policy offers the potential to enhance well-being for most citizens, priming redistributive policy strengthens overall support for redistribution as a viable policy outcome and a credible avenue.

Table 1. Support for Redistribution: Hierarchical Logit Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1†</th>
<th>Model 2≀</th>
<th>Model 3‡</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between-group inequality</td>
<td>−12.16**</td>
<td>−7.22**</td>
<td>−10.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.32)</td>
<td>(.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(00)</td>
<td>(00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>−.05**</td>
<td>−.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(00)</td>
<td>(00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita (PPP in 1000s of 2005 USD)</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system polarization</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative partisan balance</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPB*Polarization</td>
<td>2.08**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGI*Indigenous</td>
<td>−1.87*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.98)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BGI*Black</td>
<td>−.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
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<td>Mulatto</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other ethnicity</td>
<td>−.12</td>
<td>−.12</td>
<td>−.14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintiles of wealth</td>
<td>−.03**</td>
<td>−.04**</td>
<td>−.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic economic evaluations</td>
<td>−.09**</td>
<td>−.09**</td>
<td>−.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal economic evaluations</td>
<td>−.08**</td>
<td>−.08**</td>
<td>−.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>−.04**</td>
<td>−.04**</td>
<td>−.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
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<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
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Table 1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1†</th>
<th>Model 2≀</th>
<th>Model 3‡</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.01*</td>
<td>.01*</td>
<td>.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(00)</td>
<td>(00)</td>
<td>(00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>−.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(02)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−1.05</td>
<td>−3.24</td>
<td>−1.62</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>(4.81)</td>
<td>(2.94)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country-year variance component</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year variance component</td>
<td>19.03</td>
<td>25.38</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual N</td>
<td>55,366</td>
<td>55,366</td>
<td>55,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-year N</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Models estimated in Stata 14.0 using gllamm. See appendix for measurement details and descriptive statistics. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p < .05 for individual-level variables and p < .10 for country-level variables.

** p < .01 for individual-level variables and p < .05 for country-level variables.

† χ² = 5641.48 (17 df), p < .01.

≀ χ² = 5639.29 (17 df), p < .01.

‡ χ² = 5633.95 (20 df), p < .01.
for improving well-being. Alternatively, if parties are indistinguishable on distributive issues, politicians are less likely to emphasize redistribution and may instead extend particularistic benefits, use personalist appeals, or emphasize other issues. As a result, citizens in these party systems are less likely to focus on collective distributional issues and may (rightly) calculate that redistributive policies are unlikely to emerge. In such a context, people may give more attention to individual or familial strategies for self-advancement, like clientelism, rather than strongly favoring society-wide redistribution, which may be incompatible with particularistic benefit delivery.

Model 2 explores whether this positive relationship between ideologically differentiated parties and support for redistribution is mediated by the presence (absence) of viable left options in the party system, interacting party system polarization with the ideological composition of the legislature.\(^21\) As suggested by the positive and significant interaction term and demonstrated in figure 1, the positive relationship between polarization and support for redistribution is more pronounced where left parties are major players in the party system. Conversely, where ideological differentiation exists but is confined to the right side of the spectrum and the party system offers few left options, polarization actually depresses support for redistribution.\(^22\) In countries without significant left parties like Colombia and Paraguay, greater ideological differentiation is unlikely to promote the salience and perceived viability of redistributive policy and instead undermines support for pro-poor policy (net of other factors). Alternatively, in party systems that feature meaningful left parties, such as Uruguay and Brazil, programmatic competition around distributional issues significantly strengthens support for state redistribution. For example, the Uruguayan party system, which features a moderate level of ideological polarization around distributional issues as well as a meaningful option on the left in Frente Amplio, contributes to higher levels of support for redistribution, than both the Colombian party system, which is also moderately polarized but lacks options on the left, and the Honduran system, which does not feature programmatic competition on distributive issues.\(^23\)

These findings suggest that the structure of party competition shapes public attitudes toward redistribution by priming or downplaying distributional issues, depending on the ideological tenor of competition.

In model 3, we explore further the ways in which race and ethnicity shape distributional preferences. First, model 3 adds a measure of ethnic fractionalization to the base model in column 1 to assess whether the observed effects of BGI are driven by inequality across groups rather than the mere existence of ethnic fractionalization in society.\(^24\) The previously observed results for BGI as well as the other contextual variables hold under this specification, and ethnic fractionalization fails to attain statistical significance. This finding suggests that the economic divide between ethnic groups is more important than the presence of ethnic diversity in and of itself.

Additionally, we include cross-level interactions to assess how BGI conditions the effects of individual ethnicity. By interacting BGI with indigenous and black identity, we are able to assess how group-based inequalities shape distributional attitudes among individuals from traditionally marginalized groups. We posited two competing hypotheses concerning this conditional relationship. The social identity view would expect between-group differences to widen attitudinal divides between dominant and marginalized ethnic groups, with excluded groups being even more supportive of redistribution under conditions of high BGI. Alternatively, the political-structural view suggests legacies of exclusion and discrimination might lead group-based inequalities to attenuate support for state redistribution.

\(^{21}\) To attain model convergence, we excluded Gini and redistribution. The coefficients for the other contextual and individual effects estimated here are substantively consistent with those in model 1.

\(^{22}\) Replicating this analysis in a two-level model reveals a similar pattern to that observed here, but the interaction term does not attain statistical significance.

\(^{23}\) In 2010, Uruguayan support for redistribution averaged 0.61. In Colombia the average was 0.45 and in Honduras 0.32.

\(^{24}\) See appendix for measurement details.
among historically disadvantaged groups. Thus, the two interaction terms are important because they allow us to determine whether and how the effect of membership in a disadvantaged ethnic group changes as BGI increases.

Across all three models, people who identify as black or indigenous—ethnic/racial categories facing severe discrimination—are on average more supportive of redistribution than white respondents. This finding aligns with extant literature indicating that individuals belonging to low-status groups (i.e., blacks and indigenous) are more supportive of redistribution than those in high-status groups (i.e., whites).25 But in model 3, indigenous and black identity are each part of cross-level interactions with BGI, meaning that the coefficients reported in column 3 for those variables only indicate their effects when BGI is at zero (the mean, because BGI has been mean-centered). The interaction between BGI and black is not statistically significant, indicating that the positive relationship between being black and supporting redistribution is largely uniform across different levels of BGI (see fig. 2, panel A). This finding suggests that redistribution attitudes among blacks are not strongly altered by racially shaped income concentration; rather blacks hold consistently pro-poor policy positions except at high levels of BGI where the effect of being black remains positive but loses statistical significance.26 However, the interaction between BGI and indigenous is negative and statistically significant, meaning that the effect of being indigenous becomes less positive as BGI increases. We present the conditional coefficients depicting this interactive effect in panel B of figure 2. The figure demonstrates that indigenous attitudes toward redistribution become less positive as economic disparities between ethnic groups widen, so much so that indigenous respondents in very high BGI contexts are barely more supportive of redistribution than whites.27

25. Mestizos are also slightly more favorable toward redistribution than whites. Respondents who identify as indigenous and black are not concentrated in one or two countries, but are spread throughout the region. The Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Venezuela each have at least 4% of respondents identifying as black, while Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador are each at least 4% indigenous.

26. Most likely, black identity is not significant in countries with the highest BGI scores because countries in this group tend to have small Afro-descendant populations so black identity is less likely to achieve statistical significance because the number of respondents in the category is quite small.

27. The insignificant result for the black-BGI interaction, in contrast to the significant negative interaction with indigenous identity may stem from different patterns of identity formation and encounters with the state. Black identity is somewhat more easily surmounted by education or high-status employment which permits some movement into intermediate racial categories (Howard 2001; Sue and Golash-Boza 2009), whereas indigenous identity is comparatively less malleable (although certainly not immutable) and more determined by culture and language (Thorpe and Paredes 2010). In fact, some have argued that indigenous Latin Americans face “among the highest discriminatory barriers in the world” (Yashar 2005, 14). These patterns may have generated legacies of greater formal impediments for indigenous to access social programs and political influence than those faced by Afro-Latinos and could account for the differences observed between the two groups here. Additional research would be required to explore these ideas thoroughly.

28. Average support for redistribution among indigenous respondents in 2010 for these countries are as follows: Bolivia = 0.32; Ecuador = 0.43; Guatemala = 0.45; Chile = 0.67; Nicaragua = 0.76; Panama = 0.64. Each of these countries has a significant minority of the population identifying as indigenous.
fort to be particularly small or ineffective in contexts where the indigenous population is large and faces long legacies of exclusion (e.g., Huber and Stephens 2012; Lustig et al. 2014; Pribble 2010).

To further assess the validity of the political-structural mechanism through which BGI conditions the effect of indigenous identity, we conducted additional analysis of trust in the actors primarily responsible for (not) pursuing society-wide redistributive policy making—political parties. If the theoretical logic of the political-structural mechanism that we have posited carries empirical weight in explaining the negative interaction between BGI and indigenous identity, we would expect indigenous Latin Americans to be particularly distrusting of political parties, and this distrust should be magnified in contexts of high BGI where ethnic inequalities are pervasive. This is the pattern that we observe. In general, indigenous respondents are significantly less trusting of parties than whites, and as BGI increases, the effect of being indigenous becomes increasingly negative. This analysis of trust in parties provides additional evidence that indigenous Latin Americans, especially those in high BGI countries, do not trust the policy-making apparatus to pursue their interests. As a result, they view redistributive policy as ineffective at combating entrenched inequalities and as failing to alter the basic challenges facing indigenous communities. Supplemental material presents the full analysis of trust in parties as well as a figure depicting the marginal effect of indigenous identity conditioned on BGI.

Calculating the substantive effects of significant predictors in the logit analysis further emphasizes the importance of considering racial/ethnic dynamics and patterns of inequality as well as the nature of political competition in order to understand redistributive preferences. Table 2 allows us to take these substantive effects into account by presenting predicted probabilities for all significant coefficients in model 3. Of all the variables in the analysis, between-ethnic group inequality has the largest effect on attitudes toward redistribution, with a 2 standard deviation increase in BGI reducing the probability of supporting redistributive policies by 0.17 points. This reduction is equivalent to approximately half a standard deviation on our di-

![A. Effect of black group membership](image1)

![B. Effect of Indigenous group membership](image2)

Figure 2. Effect of indigenous and black group membership on support for redistribution, across observed values of BGI. A. Black group membership. B. Indigenous group membership. Solid lines indicate estimated effect for observed values of BGI; dotted lines indicate 90% confidence interval.

Table 2. Support for Redistribution: Predicted Probabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Probability</th>
<th>Δ Predicted Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between-group inequality</td>
<td>−.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system polarization</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintiles of wealth</td>
<td>−.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic economic evaluations</td>
<td>−.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal economic evaluations</td>
<td>−.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>−.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Only variables with significant effects in model 3 are included here. For continuous variables, cells depict change in the predicted probability of support for redistribution when moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. For dichotomous variables, cells depict change when moving from 0 to 1. In calculating effects of indigenous, black, and BGI, the other component of the relevant interaction term is set to zero. Thus, the effect of BGI is for whites, and the effects of indigenous and black are when mean-centered BGI is at its mean of zero.
chotomous dependent variable. In concrete terms, this is the difference between levels of support for redistribution in Bolivia, where BGI is high and support for redistribution is low, and Colombia where both BGI and redistribution attitudes are near the sample mean. Moreover, indigenous identity has the largest individual-level effect, increasing support for redistribution by 0.05 points when BGI is at its mean. Having polarized parties also has a substantial effect, increasing the probability of supporting redistribution by 0.06 points on average. These substantively important effects further support our argument concerning the centrality of the racial/ethnic composition of inequality and patterns of political competition in shaping Latin American support for redistribution.

Finally, we consider the remaining individual level variables presented in the lower portions of our tables. Individual effects are highly stable across specifications so we focus on the final model. Generally, these variables have the expected effects. People with greater wealth and those with more positive assessments of their economic situation are less likely to support redistribution than the poor and respondents who have more negative views of their wellbeing, which indicates that those most likely to benefit from pro-poor policies are also most likely to support redistribution. People who evaluate the national economy positively are less supportive of redistribution than respondents with more negative economic assessments, indicating that Latin Americans view redistribution as less important when there are more economic opportunities. Additionally, older and more educated respondents as well as those who attend church infrequently have more positive views of redistribution.

29. Table 6 of the appendix presents a more streamlined model, which removes all individual-level variables except sociodemographic indicators. Those results are consistent with the evidence presented here concerning contextual and individual-level effects. Tables 7–24 of the appendix present separate models for each country-year to assess the stability of individual-level effects across countries and years. Results indicate only infrequent deviations from the patterns observed in the hierarchical analyses presented here.

CONCLUSION
This article has presented evidence that patterns of party competition and structures of economic inequality are pivotal for understanding how support for redistribution varies across and within Latin American countries. With regard to political competition, we found that party systems containing parties that compete on programmatic issues pertaining to inequality and redistribution prompt citizens to emphasize redistribution as a goal of the state, particularly where voters are presented with meaningful options on the left. Alternatively, when programmatic competition is confined to the right side of the ideological spectrum or when parties do not take strong positions on distributional issues and instead rely more on clientelism or charisma, citizens are less likely to advocate strongly for state redistribution. Thus, analyses of distributional attitudes should not assume that party systems feature programmatic competition spanning the ideological spectrum but should rather consider how the nature of party system linkage strategies and the ideological tenor of partisan competition might shape support for redistribution. Moreover, these findings highlight the downstream significance of extant scholarship that emphasizes the role of economic legacies, class structures, and regime dynamics in shaping the nature of party system competition and individual party strategies in Latin America (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Morgan 2011; Roberts 2015). Additional research that builds on this work and seeks more detailed understanding of the specific factors that motivate or constrain political elites to politicize (or minimize) the distributional elements of political conflict would also be valuable.

With regard to the structure of inequality, we considered how the concentration of economic disadvantage in certain ethnic groups affects attitudes toward redistribution, finding that support for redistribution is depressed as the economic divide between ethnic groups grows. In such a context, society-wide solidarity is limited, and dominant ethnic groups are more likely to see redistribution as a benefit to “others.” As a result, overall enthusiasm for government redistribution is lower. This is an important finding for those who seek policy solutions to economic inequality, as such solutions may be more or less attainable depending on how inequality is structured across population subgroups. While higher levels of inequality generally increase support for redistribution and thus have the potential to enhance the political feasibility of pro-poor policies, support for redistribution is eroded if this inequality disproportionately hurts (or benefits) certain ethnic or racial groups. Therefore, in contexts with high between-group inequality, policy makers are likely to encounter impediments to building a political consensus in favor of state redistribution. Here we focused on the way in which inequality is distributed across ethnic groups, but structural patterns of inequality rooted in other population subgroups, such as region or economic sector, could also be relevant in some contexts. Exploring these potential effects offers an important direction for future inquiry.

We also examined how rising between-group inequality conditions the effect of belonging to historically marginalized ethnic groups and found that high BGI erodes indigenous respondents’ support for redistribution. This find-
ing suggests that group-based economic divides rooted in practices of exclusion and discrimination contribute to the delegitimization of the policy process among those who have been the victims of these practices. Rather than seeing redistributive policy as a tool for leveling the playing field, our evidence suggests that ethnically based economic divides create the perception that government action is unlikely to alter the fundamental patterns of exclusion that harm marginalized groups. As a result, historically marginalized groups existing in contexts of persistent group-based inequalities do not see redistribution as a mechanism for transforming their status, which weakens their support for state policies promising to combat inequality. This finding aligns with previous research concerning historical legacies of exclusion and the nature of the relationship between indigenous communities and the Latin American state apparatus. Further research outside Latin America is necessary to explore whether this pattern (in which high between-group inequalities erode marginalized groups’ enthusiasm for state redistribution) is particular to the Latin American context where welfare states have often failed to reach the most vulnerable in society or whether it is the inherent result of economic structures that feature deep group-based divides.

The insights drawn here have the potential to illuminate our understanding of distributional preference formation more broadly. Although our evidence can only generate direct inferences about Latin America, patterns of inequality may also matter in other contexts where economic and social exclusion are reinforcing, which we observe in places as diverse as Bolivia, India, South Africa, and the United States. In fact, our results are consistent with findings from related studies in other regions, which have focused on the ways that structures of inequality influence the delivery of public goods (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Lupu and Pontusson 2011). Moreover, our analysis of public opinion advances beyond extant research by demonstrating how sociostructural inequalities shape redistribution attitudes in the mass public, thereby uncovering an important mechanism linking patterns of inequality to the welfare state outcomes analyzed previously. What’s more, our findings suggest that accounting for the structure of inequality is especially important in comparative analyses that combine countries with a range of different inequality patterns, as we have done here and is often the case in cross-national studies. Failing to consider patterns of inequality across countries may neglect an important avenue through which inequality shapes public opinion toward state redistribution, and ignoring these patterns may obscure or distort our understanding of the ways in which inequality matters.

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

We thank Andy Baker, Kate Baldwin, Merike Blofield, Evelyne Huber, Bob Kaufman, Juan Pablo Luna, Noam Lupu, Jenny Pribble, Fred Solt, and the three anonymous reviewers at the JOP as well as Lanny Martin for their constructive ideas and comments regarding this project. We are also grateful for helpful feedback from seminar participants at Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE) in Lima, University of Colorado at Boulder, University of Kentucky, University of Tennessee, Vanderbilt University, and the National Science Foundation Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences. We thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the US Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the individual-level survey data available.

**REFERENCES**


